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THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A 
BYRD’S EYE VIEW 
ELLEN P. APRILL* AND DANIEL J. HEMEL** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 2017 was, among other distinctions, the year of the Byrd rule. This 
once-obscure Senate procedural provision—on the books since 1985 but only 
recently the stuff of page one news1— featured prominently in several failed 
attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act in the spring and summer. Then again 
at year’s end, the Byrd rule played a central role in the successful effort to rewrite 
large swaths of the Internal Revenue Code. While the Byrd rule has influenced 
the legislative process in the past, never before has it drawn so much attention 
from the mainstream and trade press, and never before has it shaped so 
consequential a law in such a significant way. 
One theme that runs throughout this article is that when it comes to the 
budget math mandated by the Byrd rule, numbers can obscure the truth. But in 
other respects, numbers accurately illustrate the Byrd rule’s trajectory. Figure 1 
tracks the number of articles referencing the Byrd rule in the archives of the New 
York Times and the tax trade publication Tax Notes Weekly over the last three 
decades. According to both metrics, interest in the Byrd rule soared to new 
heights in the first year of the Trump presidency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2018 by Ellen P. Aprill and Daniel J. Hemel. 
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.  
           *   John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; ellen.aprill@lls.edu. 
 **  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; dhemel@uchicago.edu. The 
authors thank Cheryl Block, Ari Glogower, Julie Roin, George Yin, and Lawrence Zelenak for insightful 
comments, Christopher Hurley for excellent research assistance, the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann 
McNees Faculty Research Fund for financial support, and Arnold Aprill and Eric Hemel for inspiring 
this collaboration. All errors are our own. 
 1.  The first reference to the Byrd rule in an article beginning on page one of the New York Times 
came in March 2010, in the run-up to the passage of the Affordable Care Act. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Going From Under the Radar to Under a Capitol Microscope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at A1. 
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Figure 1. Articles Referencing “Byrd Rule” in New York Times and Tax 
Notes Weekly, 1988-2017 
 
 
The Byrd rule’s impact can be seen all throughout the new tax law, starting 
from the top. It was the Byrd rule that blocked the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” from 
becoming the bill’s short title. As a result, the most important tax legislation in 
more than thirty years will go down in history unmelodiously as “An act to 
provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution 
on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” The Byrd rule also is the reason that key 
elements of the new tax law—including the reduction in individual income tax 
rates, the expansion of the child tax credit, the increase in the standard deduction, 
the new deduction for pass-through income, and the increase in the estate and 
gift tax exemption—are set to expire at the end of 2025. And the Byrd rule is the 
reason why a number of provisions that appeared in earlier versions of the bill—
including a measure that would have allowed 501(c)(3) organizations to 
participate in political campaigns, several significant changes to the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit, and the repeal of the tax-exempt status of professional 
sports leagues—all were eliminated from the final legislation. 
Some of these consequences were predictable from the outset. Even before 
details of the tax bill emerged, many commentators drew attention2 to the 
 
 2.  See, e.g., Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Republicans’ Tax-Cut Myth Is About to Crumble, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/12/republicans-tax-
cut-myth-is-about-to-crumble/?utm_term=.e37a01f8705e [https://perma.cc/WJQ6-QL3K]; Todd 
Simmens, Will We Get Tax Reform? It’s a Matter of Debate, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2017/09/15/will-we-get-tax-reform-its-a-matter-of-congressional-
debate/#4864dd6c64d2 [https://perma.cc/3VBK-PFP7]. For insightful discussions of this feature of the 
Byrd rule, see generally Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2011); Rebecca 
M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. 
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provision of the Byrd rule barring budget reconciliation bills that add to the 
deficit beyond the budget window, which in this case was ten years.3 Informed 
observers thus expected—correctly, as it turned out—that the Byrd rule would 
compel Congress to phase out important elements of the bill, just as the Byrd rule 
resulted in the sunset of the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts.4 In other cases, even 
seasoned Senators were blindsided by the Byrd rule’s ramifications. Indeed, the 
Byrd rule’s little-understood requirement that every provision in a reconciliation 
bill must produce revenue effects that are more than “merely incidental” to the 
non-budgetary consequences caused a minor crisis in the moments leading up to 
final passage of the 2017 tax legislation, with the House of Representatives 
ultimately having to pass the conference report twice before leaving Washington 
for the winter holiday.5 
In all likelihood, this is not the last time that the Byrd rule will play a 
conspicuous and consequential role in the tax legislative process. Increasing 
political polarization, combined with the reality that neither party appears poised 
to capture a filibuster-proof Senate majority in the foreseeable future, will lead 
to greater reliance on budget reconciliation to enact tax legislation. 
Congressional contentiousness—which is unlikely to abate any time soon—will 
cause Senators to invoke the Byrd rule against potential violations that went 
unchallenged in past reconciliation efforts. The party in power can preempt some 
Byrd rule challenges by adopting a longer budget window or setting a higher 
ceiling on the allowable deficit impact. Yet as long as the Byrd rule remains 
binding, the rule’s restrictions will influence the procedure and substance of 
federal tax law. 
Some of the Byrd rule’s results are—at least arguably—quite welcome. Not 
only does the Byrd rule impose a measure of fiscal discipline on Congress, but it 
also stands in the way of some provisions that do little more than reward 
politically well-connected special interests. Moreover, by narrowing the set of 
issues that can be the subject of budget negotiations, the Byrd rule may reduce 
the risk of holdup and hasten arrival at compromise. And at least as compared to 
the alternative of a budget reconciliation process without any limitations as to 
 
REV. 335 (2006); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal 
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2009). 
 3.  See H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017) (establishing the congressional budget for the U.S. 
Government for fiscal year 2018 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2019–
2027). 
 4.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003); 
Economic Growth & Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001); see 
also Elizabeth Garrett, Accounting for the Federal Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 
194–98 (2004); Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 2, at 2010–21; Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 2, 
at 376–78, 380–82; Yin, supra note 2, at 189–92. Yin, uniquely, sees this effect of the Byrd rule as 
potentially positive. See Yin, supra note 2, at 180 (“[A]doption of temporary-effect legislation increases 
political accountability and may enhance fiscal restraint.”).  
 5.  See Thomas Kaplan, House Gives Final Approval to Sweeping Tax Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/politics/tax-bill-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/ 
5CTS-TLCV]. 
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scope, the Byrd rule preserves a role for the minority party in the Senate, 
potentially promoting a more consensus-oriented approach to lawmaking. 
In other respects, the Byrd rule’s ramifications are more disconcerting. The 
song and dance of setting deficit targets and then complying with those targets 
through sunset provisions arguably allows lawmakers to maintain the appearance 
of fiscal discipline without exercising such discipline in fact. And ironically, the 
Byrd rule has stood in the way of various measures that would have imposed 
further fiscal discipline on the budget reconciliation process and that would have 
closed apparent loopholes. The Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” limit also 
constrains Congress from enacting tax simplification measures through budget 
reconciliation, and the deficit-related restrictions result in a code that is cluttered 
with temporary and dormant provisions. Finally, the Byrd rule reduces the 
transparency of a tax legislative process that already seems inscrutable to many 
voters. To address this last problem, this article tentatively suggests several steps 
that Senators, their staffs, and the Senate Parliamentarian might take to make 
the Byrd rule’s operation somewhat less opaque. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the budget 
reconciliation process and explains the Byrd rule’s role in that process. Part II 
examines how the Senate Parliamentarian—the nonpartisan official tasked with 
interpreting most elements of the Byrd rule—has construed the rule’s provisions 
in past reconciliation efforts. Part III turns toward the bill formerly known as the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, and explains how the Byrd rule shaped Congress’s 
final product. The article ends in Part IV with a reflection on the Byrd rule’s 
future and evaluates the practical and normative implications of the Byrd rule’s 
ever-more-prominent role. 
II 
BUDGET RECONCILIATION AND THE BYRD RULE IN BRIEF 
Understanding the operation of the Byrd rule requires first understanding the 
importance of the budget reconciliation process, and understanding the role of 
budget reconciliation requires understanding the significance of the Senate’s 
cloture procedure. This part begins by explaining the evolution of cloture and 
then explains how that procedure relates to the Byrd rule. 
For most of the Senate’s history, its members have been able to extend debate 
on pending measures indefinitely—a practice known as the filibuster.6 The 
filibuster is a feature that defines the character of the institution and that 
 
 6.  See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXII, S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LYZ-
6TJV]; VALERIE HEITSCHUSEN & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360, 
FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 1 (2017); Sarah Blinder, The History of the Filibuster, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-history-of-the-filibuster/ 
[https://perma.cc/73XX-CWES] (testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 198 (1997); 
see generally GREGORY WAWRO & ERICK SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING 
IN THE U.S. SENATE (2006).  
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distinguishes the Senate from other legislative bodies.7 Only for the last hundred 
years have Senate rules provided for “cloture,” a maneuver that brings an end to 
debate through a supermajority vote (initially two-thirds, and now sixty votes).8 
Until 1974, the rule that any measure could be filibustered applied to all 
legislation in the Senate, including budget bills. 
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 marked a change to the rule that only 
a supermajority could cut off debate in the Senate.9 With the goal of reining in 
the budgetary process, Congress implemented a new budget reconciliation 
procedure that allows revenue-related measures to pass the Senate without the 
possibility of a filibuster. The procedure begins with the House and Senate 
passing a concurrent budget resolution that gives “reconciliation instructions” to 
subject-matter committees.10 These instructions generally direct subject-matter 
committees to report legislation that increases or decreases revenue or outlays 
by up to a specified amount over a defined budget window. For example, the 
concurrent resolution for fiscal year 2018 instructed the House Ways and Means 
and Senate Finance Committees to submit changes that would increase the deficit 
by no more than $1.5 trillion for fiscal years 2018 through 2027.11 The House and 
Senate have never set a budget window longer than ten years, though there is 
nothing in the text of the Budget Act that would prohibit them from choosing a 
longer period.12 
Once the House and Senate agree to a concurrent resolution with 
reconciliation instructions, subject-matter committees in both chambers then 
report legislation that implements those instructions. Each chamber then 
considers the legislation produced by its committees.13 If the House and Senate 
pass bills that are not identical, a committee of lawmakers works out a conference 
report that must be approved again in identical form by each chamber and 
 
 7.  Gregory J. Wawro & Eric Schickler, Legislative Obstructionism, 13 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 297, 
297 (2010). 
 8.  STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 6, at 15–17 (2013); FLOYD M. RIDDICK, & ALAN 
S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. 101-28, at 282–
334 (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992).  
 9.  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–88 (1990)); see generally MEGAN S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERVICE, R44058, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: STATES OF CONSIDERATION 
(2017). 
 10.  See U.S. Senate Glossary, Budget Resolution, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
glossary_term/budget_resolution.htm [https://perma.cc/63SQ-HX49] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 11.  H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 12.  Dylan F. Moroses & Stephen K. Cooper, Questions Raised on Budget Window Extension for 
Tax Reform, TAX ANALYSTS (May 13, 2017), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/questions-raised-
budget-window-extension-tax-reform [https://perma.cc/7A8T-QCET]; Brian Riedl, Extend Budget 
Resolution for Tax Reform and Fiscal Responsibility, MANHATTAN INST. (June 22, 2017), 
http://economics21.org/html/extend-budget-resolution-window-tax-reform-and-fiscal-responsibility-
2410.html [https://perma.cc/QU6Z-LBB3].  
 13.  See U.S. Senate Glossary, Reconciliation Bill, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
glossary_term/reconciliation_bill.htm [https://perma.cc/ZWW8-WBNV] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
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presented to the President for signature or veto.14 
The availability of this new fast-track process threatened to undermine the 
Senate’s supermajoritarian norms by allowing a simple majority to enact 
measures via reconciliation that had little relation to the federal budget. To 
protect the reconciliation process from abuse, Democratic Senator Robert Byrd 
of West Virginia introduced the rule that now bears his name. In introducing the 
provision in October 1985, Senator Byrd explained: 
Mr. President, the amendment speaks for itself. I would just say that we are in the 
process now of seeing, if we have not seen earlier, the Pandora’s box which has been 
opened to the abuse of the reconciliation process. That process was never meant to be 
used as it is being used. 
. . . 
Mr. President, the Senate is a deliberative body, and the reconciliation process is not a 
deliberative process. It [is] not a deliberative process. Such an extraordinary process, if 
abused, could destroy the Senate’s deliberative nature . . .15 
The Senate adopted the Byrd rule unanimously, 96-0.16 
Although it was initially a temporary measure,17 Congress made the Byrd rule 
permanent and codified it in 1990.18 In its present form, the Byrd rule applies to 
legislation at each stage of the budget reconciliation process: to budget 
resolutions with reconciliation instructions, to reconciliation bills, and to 
conference reports that emerge when each chamber passes separate 
reconciliation legislation.19 Whenever the Senate is considering any of these 
“measures, any Senator can raise a point of order20 asserting that the legislation 
includes a provision that is “extraneous.” The Byrd rule defines a provision as 
“extraneous” if it: 
(A) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues; 
(B) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the 
reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution; 
(C) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the provision; 
(D) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely incidental to the non-
budgetary components of the provision; 
(E) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified in the budget 
resolution (i.e., the “budget window”); or 
 
 14.  See U.S. Senate Glossary, Conference Report, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
glossary_term/conference_report.htm [https://perma.cc/6WAR-DNEB] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
 15.  WILLIAM G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PROCESS LAW ANNOTATED 231–32 n.616 (1993) (quoting 131 
CONG. REC. S14,032-37 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985)). 
 16.  Id. at 237 (quoting 131 CONG. REC. S14,038). Senators Eagleton, Hatfield, Simon, and Stennis 
were absent. Id.  
 17.  See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1–2 (2016).  
 18.  2 U.S.C. § 644 (2012). 
 19.  See id. § 644(a), (d). 
 20.   See U.S. Senate Glossary, Point of Order, Senate.gov, http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
glossary_term/point_of_order.htm [https://perma.cc/K8YR-A26L] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
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(F) recommends changes to Social Security.21 
The Byrd rule is not self-executing: a provision will be stricken from a 
reconciliation bill only if it is challenged on grounds that it is extraneous. And 
once a provision has been challenged on the grounds that it is extraneous, the 
Presiding Officer22 of the Senate—who is either the Vice President or a majority 
party member selected by the Senate’s President pro tempore—must decide 
whether to sustain or overrule the point of order.23 If the Presiding Officer 
sustains the point of order (in other words, agrees that the provision is 
extraneous), the provision is stricken from the legislation24 unless sixty Senators 
vote to waive the Byrd rule or override the Presiding Officer.25 Likewise, if the 
Presiding Officer rejects the point of order, sixty Senators can overcome that 
ruling to strike the provision.26 
In practice, the Presiding Officer rarely rules on a Byrd rule point of order 
before consulting one of two individuals: the Senate Budget Committee Chair or 
the Senate Parliamentarian.27 The Senate Budget Committee Chair advises the 
Presiding Officer with respect to Byrd rule challenges made under subparagraphs 
(B) and (E): whether the revenue effects conform to the concurrent resolution’s 
reconciliation instructions and whether the bill increases the deficit beyond the 
budget window. As a matter of practice, the Senate Budget Committee Chair 
defers to revenue estimates produced by the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (JCT) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) with respect to 
these types of Byrd Rule challenges.28 Former Senate Finance Committee Chair 
Bob Dole reportedly said that the entire process “made him feel like the chair of 
a subcommittee of the Budget Committee, rather than chair of the usually 
powerful Finance Committee.”29 
 
 21.  See § 644(b)(1). 
 22. See U.S. Senate Glossary, Presiding Officer, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
glossary_term/presiding_officer.htm [https://perma.cc/9PSM-9C72] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
 23.  § 644(e); see also Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax 
Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 882 (2002) (“The meaning of ‘extraneous’ can be complex, 
ambiguous, and often depends on controversial rulings from the Chair.”). 
 24.  2 U.S.C. § 644(a), (e) (2012). 
 25.  HENIFF, JR., supra note 17, at 4. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 8, at 505; IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43532, OFFICES AND OFFICIALS IN THE SENATE: ROLES AND DUTIES (2015); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20544, THE OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIAN IN THE HOUSE AND 
SENATE (2017). Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott fired Parliamentarian Robert Dove rather than 
ignoring his rulings. See infra text accompanying notes 82–85. 
 28.  See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-560, BASELINES AND SCOREKEEPING IN 
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 1–2 (2012); JAMES V. SATURNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-
721, INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 8 (2012); CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET OFFICE (2016), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ 
files/cbofiles/attachments/2016-IntroToCBO.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNS4-MN9F]; About Us, STAFF OF J. 
COMM. ON TAX’N, http://www.jct.gov/about-us/statutory-basis.html [https://perma.cc/72R3-GUXB] (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
 29.  George K. Yin, The Evolving Legislative Process: Implications for Tax Reform, 114 TAX NOTES 
313, 316–17 (2007) (quoting JOHN B. GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCE? CONGRESS, THE 
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To illustrate: if a Senator raised a point of order objecting to the recent tax 
law on the grounds that it adds more than $1.5 trillion to the deficit over the 2018–
2027 budget window, the Presiding Officer would presumably defer to the Senate 
Budget Committee Chair’s judgment as to whether the point of order should be 
sustained. The Senate Budget Committee Chair would then consult the JCT staff 
and the CBO. Likewise, if a Senator raised a point of order claiming that the 
reconciliation bill adds to the deficit beyond the budget window, the Senate 
Budget Committee Chair would likely resolve that dispute based on the JCT and 
CBO projections. 
To be sure, there is no statute requiring that the Senate Budget Committee 
Chair yield to the JCT and CBO estimates. Thus, the Presiding Officer’s 
deference to the Senate Budget Committee Chair in instances of Byrd rule 
challenges vests the Budget Committee Chair with considerable power.30 
However, the Senate Budget Committee Chair’s power to override JCT and 
CBO estimates has long remained latent.31 
In contrast to the Senate Budget Committee Chair’s role in adjudicating Byrd 
rule challenges under subparagraphs (B) and (E), it is the Senate Parliamentarian 
who generally calls the shots with respect to challenges raised under the Byrd 
rule’s other provisions. The Senate Parliamentarian is a nonpartisan official who 
serves as the official adviser to the Senate on the interpretation of the body’s 
rules and procedures.32 With very few exceptions,33 the Presiding Officer follows 
the Parliamentarian’s recommendations on matters of procedure, and no reports 
indicate that the Presiding Officer has ever rejected the Parliamentarian’s advice 
with respect to a Byrd rule point of order. 
 
BUDGET PROCESS AND THE DEFICIT 148 (1990)). 
 30.  See Daniel Hemel & David Herzig, The Art of the (Budget) Deal, YALE J. ON REG. (Dec. 2, 
2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-art-of-the-budget-deal-by-daniel-hemel-and-david-herzig [https:// 
perma.cc/6RAN-TGGC]. 
 31.  The idea of exercising this power more robustly had been floated by some commentators in the 
lead-up to the recent tax reform. See Tara Golshan, The Republican Tax Reform Bill Will Live and Die 
By This Obscure Senate Rule, VOX (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/ 
11/14/16634200/republican-tax-reform-byrd-rule [https://perma.cc/4FRM-NY5H] (“The Senate Budget 
Committee could also use a different, more ideologically conservative score of their tax plan instead of 
the CBO’s evaluation.”). Despite criticism from some Republican Senators that the JCT’s economic 
growth projections were too low, the Senate still used its scores when crafting the recent tax reform 
legislation. See Senate Republicans Scramble to Find Revenue for Tax Bill with Vote Expected Friday, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/politics/tax-overhaul-senate-
debate.html [https://perma.cc/8LVS-KQR9]. 
 32.  See U.S. Senate Glossary, Parliamentarian, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
glossary_term/parliamentarian.html [https://perma.cc/ZV66-VKU6] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018); U.S. 
H.R. COMM. ON RULES, SUMMARY OF THE BYRD RULE, http://archives-democrats-rules.house.gov/ 
archives/byrd_rule.htm [http://perma.cc/9XYU-6UY9] (archived) (last visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
 33.  One such instance was in February 1987, when then-Vice President George H.W. Bush exercised 
this power during a now-forgotten fight over energy efficiency standards. See Bernard Weinraub, 
Appliances, Rules and Politics Have Senators in an Uproar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 1987), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/06/us/appliances-rules-and-politics-have-senators-in-an-uproar.html 
[https://perma.cc/SEM5-CDUK]. 
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While points of order are raised and decided in public view,34 the 
Parliamentarian exerts her influence over the interpretation of the Byrd rule 
largely behind closed doors. In a so-called “Byrd bath,”35 representatives from 
the majority and minority parties in the Senate (usually Budget and Finance 
Committee staffers, but occasionally others) will meet with the Parliamentarian 
and debate which provisions violate the Byrd rule’s strictures. Sponsors generally 
remove such provisions36 before the bill goes to a final vote. (Continuing with the 
avian theme, staffers sometimes refer to such provisions as “Byrd droppings.”37) 
As a result, the handful of cases in which the Presiding Officer has ruled on 
whether a provision violates the Byrd rule’s strictures represent just a small share 
of the total number of instances in which material has been stripped from 
legislation on the advice of the Parliamentarian.38 
Of all the Byrd rule’s elements, it is subparagraph (E)—the prohibition on 
provisions that “produce[] changes in outlays or revenues that are merely 
incidental to the non-budgetary consequences”—that adds most to the opacity of 
the Byrd bath process. It is, in jurisprudential terms, a “standard” rather than a 
“rule,”39 and it is an especially amorphous standard at that. An annotated edition 
of the federal budget laws produced by the Senate Budget Committee in 1993 so 
concedes: 
This subparagraph contributes much of the ambiguity created by [the Byrd rule]. Its 
language calls for the exercise of judgment. The Parliamentarian has not laid down any 
bright-line test to aid that judgment, and reserves the right to consider each individual 
case on its merits. 
The drafters of this subparagraph wished to prohibit provisions in which policy changes 
plainly overwhelmed deficit changes. For example, a nationwide abortion prohibition 
might marginally reduce Government spending, but would constitute a much more 
significant policy change than budgetary action. The application of this subparagraph, 
however, has ranged wider than such plain cases.40 
 
 34.  See 2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2012). 
 35.  See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 149 (3d 
ed. 2007); Margot Sanger-Katz, Byrd Bath: Seven Provisions That Could Disappear from the Senate 
Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/upshot/byrd-bath-seven-
provisions-that-could-disappear-from-the-senate-health-bill.html [https://perma.cc/9KXD-TYT8].  
 36.  See Yin, supra note 2, at 216; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Parliamentarian in Role as Health Bill Referee, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/us/politics/14rules.html [https:// 
perma.cc/M9AY-6PB9]. 
 37.  See Yin, supra note 2, at 216; Stolberg, supra note 36.  
 38.  See HENIFF, JR., supra note 17, at 20–32, tbl.4. 
 39.  One prominent scholar frames the distinction as follows:  
The general debate over legal form in jurisprudence and private law characterizes rule-like 
directives as affording less discretion than standards. . . . A legal directive is “rule”-like when it 
binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering 
facts. . . . A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into 
the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards . . . 
giv[e] the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26, 58 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
 40.  DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 208 n.580. 
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The abortion example illustrates a point that the annotation goes on to state 
explicitly: “Budgetary effect, without more, does not insulate a provision from 
violating the [‘merely incidental’ condition].”41 At the same time, “[p]rovisions 
that have budgetary effects that the Congressional Budget Office cannot estimate 
do not necessarily violate” the Byrd rule.42 It is thus clear that the “merely 
incidental” proviso does not come down to a single number. What is less clear is 
which features of a challenged provision lead the Parliamentarian to conclude 
that it runs afoul of subparagraph (E). 
III 
THE BYRD RULE IN OPERATION 
The Byrd rule’s history can be divided into five eras: (1) an early period of 
relative quietude; (2) a brief interval from 1993 to 1994 in which Democrats used 
budget reconciliation to enact important elements of President Clinton’s 
domestic policy agenda; (3) a longer stretch from 1995 until the end of the Clinton 
presidency when a Republican-controlled Congress used budget reconciliation to 
pursue its legislative goals; (4) a period in the early twenty-first century when 
budget reconciliation was used primarily to pass tax cuts and the Byrd rule’s 
primary effect was to force the inclusion of sunset provisions; and (5) the current 
period of Byrd rule battles that have shaped all aspects of the most important 
legislation in recent years. This part traces the Byrd rule through those five eras 
in an attempt to understand how it has come to play the role that it now does. 
A. The Early Years 
From the time of the Byrd rule’s introduction until 1993, the Senate used the 
budget reconciliation process primarily to enact legislation with supermajority or 
bipartisan support. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1986,43 1987,44 
and 198945 all garnered more than sixty votes. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 199046 passed by a narrower margin—only fifty-four 
votes—but those yeas included thirty-seven Democrats and seventeen 
Republicans, including both the majority and minority leaders.47 
Perhaps due to the relative amity of the Senate in those years, the Byrd rule’s 
early life was a quiet one. This is not to say, however, that Byrd rule issues were 
entirely absent from the budget reconciliation process in the late 1980s and early 
 
 41.  Id. at 509. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, H.R. 5300, 99th Cong. (1986). 
 44.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, H.R. 3545, 100th Cong. (1987).  
 45.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. (1989).  
 46.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, H.R. 5835, 101st Cong. (1990).   
 47.  See U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote 101st Congress – 2nd Session, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate. 
gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=101&session=2&vote=00326#positio
n [https://perma.cc/28G7-9AYQ] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (on H.R. 5835). No budget reconciliation bills 
were passed in 1988, 1991, or 1992. See HENIFF, JR., supra note 17, tbl.4. 
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1990s. For example, during consideration of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1990, Democratic Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio raised a point of 
order to strike two provisions imposing criminal penalties for violations of 
workplace safety laws. Senator Metzenbaum did not object to the provisions on 
substantive grounds—in fact, he had supported them in the Labor Committee. In 
explaining his point of order, Senator Metzenbaum said: 
We consulted with the Budget Committee experts before including the OSHA criminal 
penalty provisions in the reconciliation package. Based on the revenue estimate by the 
Congressional Budget Office, those experts indicated that the criminal penalty 
provisions were not extraneous under the Byrd rule. But I understand this may be a 
close question. I want to support the leaders in their effort to keep extraneous provisions 
out of this package; therefore I am willing to put the question to the Chair and to abide 
by the Chair’s ruling.48 
The Chair (that is, Presiding Officer), at the Parliamentarian’s recommendation, 
sustained the point of order and struck the criminal penalty provisions from the 
final bill. 
One of the few contentious Byrd rule debates during these early years 
concerned a provision in the 1990 Act that directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to develop a “National Aviation Noise Policy.”49 The provision 
drew strong opposition from Senators who were concerned that the new policy 
would preempt local noise controls.50 Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan of New York described it as “an atrocious measure to be on a budget 
reconciliation bill.”51 His Republican colleague from New York, Alfonse 
D’Amato, agreed, and raised a point of order on the ground that the noise policy 
produced no change in outlays or revenues.52 The Parliamentarian evidently 
concurred in D’Amato’s assessment, but the Senate voted 69–31 to waive the 
Byrd rule so that the provision could remain in the bill. Incidentally, Senator Byrd 
was one of the Senators who voted in favor of waiving his namesake rule.53 
B. 1993 as a Turning Point 
The 103rd Congress, from 1993 to 1994, was a turning point in the life of the 
Byrd rule. In 1993, for the first time since the rule’s introduction, both houses of 
Congress and the presidency were under the unified control of a single party. Bill 
Clinton began his first term with a 259–175 Democratic majority in the House, 
and a 57–43 majority in the Senate.54 Thus, a united Republican minority could 
block legislation subject to the filibuster in the Senate but could not stop 
reconciliation bills. This new configuration came at a time of increasing 
 
 48.  See 136 CONG. REC. S15,771 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990). 
 49.  See 136 CONG. REC. S15,777 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990). 
 50.  See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. Durenberger). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See KENNETH E. COLLIER, BETWEEN THE BRANCHES: THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF 
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 290, app. B (1997). 
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ideological polarization between the parties.55 
At one point in the 103rd Congress, President Clinton and Senate Majority 
Leader George Mitchell considered using the budget reconciliation process to 
pass a sweeping health care reform package. Senator Byrd, protective of the 
institution’s supermajoritarian norms, apparently nixed that idea along with a 
handful of other Democrats who thought that using budget reconciliation for 
health care reform would be, in the words of North Dakota Democrat Kent 
Conrad, an “abuse of the process” that was “not what the Founding Fathers 
intended for this body.”56 Even so, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 was distinctively contentious and partisan, with a number of provisions that 
pushed the Byrd rule’s boundaries. While health care reform was left out, the 
final bill implemented important elements of the Clinton administration 
domestic policy agenda, including an expansion of the earned income tax credit, 
the creation of “empowerment zones” and “enterprise communities,” and the 
extension of Food Stamps to new beneficiaries.57 The package passed without a 
single Republican Senator’s support, and with Vice President Al Gore casting the 
deciding vote. 
A couple of additional examples offer a taste of the Byrd rule debates during 
the 1993 budget fight. One involved a provision requiring childhood vaccine 
manufacturers who sold vaccines to the federal Centers for Disease Control to 
offer similar terms to states. During the debate over the Senate’s initial 
reconciliation bill, Republican Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon challenged that 
provision on Byrd rule grounds, and the Presiding Officer—apparently on the 
Parliamentarian’s recommendation—agreed that it was extraneous, evidently 
because the provision primarily affected state, rather than federal, budgets.58 
However, the Congressional Budget Office later said that allowing states to buy 
vaccines at the CDC price would have some effect on the price that the federal 
government paid, even though it could not quantify the effect.59 When a similar 
provision appeared in the conference report, Republican Senator John Danforth 
of Missouri challenged it. This time, however, the Presiding Officer—apparently 
again on the Parliamentarian’s recommendation—overruled the point of order 
and allowed the provision to remain in the final bill.60 
Another controversial provision in the 1993 bill imposed an assessment on 
cigarette manufacturers importing more than twenty-five percent of the tobacco 
they used. The assessment was set at a rate that would make it unprofitable for 
manufacturers to trigger it. It also caused the United States to violate 
 
 55.  See Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 
25–29 (2018). 
 56.  147 CONG. REC. S3,263 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Senator Conrad) (describing his 
reaction several years later). 
 57.  DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 209. 
 58.  Id. at 207 n.575 (citing 139 CONG. REC. S7,926, S7,928 (daily ed. June 24, 1993)). 
 59.  139 CONG. REC. S10,665, ex.1 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993). 
 60.  DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 210–12, n.580 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S10,659–61 (daily ed. Aug. 
6, 1993)). 
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international trade laws (as the World Trade Organization would later rule). The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the assessment would raise only $6 
million a year, and Republican Senator Hank Brown of Colorado raised a Byrd 
rule challenge.61 On the Parliamentarian’s recommendation, however, the 
Presiding Officer ruled that the provision’s budgetary effects were more than 
“merely incidental” to the non-budgetary consequences. 62 
C. The Byrd Rule under Divided Government 
Partisan fights over the Byrd rule continued after the November 1994 mid-
term elections, when Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress for 
the first time in forty years. During the debate over the Republican-backed 
Balanced Budget Act of 1995, then-Parliamentarian Robert Dove ruled that a 
provision that would have barred the use of federal funds for abortion violated 
the Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” proviso because, as Dove later explained, it 
“was not there to save money but to implement a huge social policy.”63 The 
Senate ultimately passed the bill without the abortion provision, although 
President Clinton’s veto prevented the bill from becoming law. 
The Byrd rule also played a role in shaping the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996, the bipartisan bill that fulfilled President 
Clinton’s promise to end “welfare as we know it.”64 The final bill passed the 
Senate by a 78–21 margin, making the resort to reconciliation unnecessary as a 
maneuver to circumvent the filibuster.65 Nonetheless, the Byrd rule shaped the 
legislation’s content in a number of ways. In July 1996, Democratic Senator 
James Exon of Nebraska raised Byrd rule points of order against several 
controversial elements of the law.66 His points of order included a provision that 
would have prevented mothers who had children while on welfare from receiving 
additional benefits,67 a measure that would have set aside $75 million from the 
Maternal and Child Health Block Grant Program to fund abstinence education, 
and a provision that would have allowed states to contract with charitable, 
religious, and private organizations to administer block grant-funded services. 
Republican Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico moved to waive all three 
 
 61.  139 CONG. REC. S10,675–77 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Gail Russell Chaddock, Who’s Al Frumin and Why Might He Shape US Health Reform?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/1014/whos-
alan-frumin-and-why-might-he-shape-us-health-reform [https://perma.cc/YY28-P9QP] (quoting Robert 
Dove). 
 64.  See Pam Fessler, Welfare “As We Know It” Ended in 1996. Did It Help or Hurt?, NPR (Aug. 21, 
2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/21/490852973/20-years-since-welfare-reform-what-are-its-lasting-
effects [https://perma.cc/L5DQ-KP3N]. 
 65.  See Personal Responsibility and Budget Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. 
(1996). 
 66.  For the debate over the Exon points of order, see 142 CONG. REC. S8,501–32 (daily ed. July 23, 
1996). 
 67.  This measure evidently would not have affected federal revenues or outlays because it did not 
alter the size of any state’s block grants. 
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points of order. His motion failed with respect to the family cap provision by a 
42–57 vote68 and failed with respect to the abstinence education measure by a 52–
46 margin.69 His motion succeeded, however, with respect to the contracting 
provision: the Senate voted 67–32 to keep that provision in the final bill, 
notwithstanding the apparent Byrd rule violation.70 
The debate over the abstinence education measure illustrates the extent to 
which the Byrd rule’s application depends critically on the definition of the word 
“provision.” Recall that the Byrd rule applies on a provision-by-provision basis: 
“a provision of a reconciliation bill . . . shall be considered extraneous if such 
provision does not produce a change in outlays or revenues . . . [or] produces 
changes in outlays or revenues which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary 
components of the provision.”71 Setting aside $75 million in Maternal and Child 
Health Services Block Grant money for abstinence education does not produce 
a change in outlays, but if the measure is construed as containing two 
provisions—one that increases spending on abstinence education by $75 million 
and one that cuts $75 million from the block grant—then each provision produces 
a change in outlays. As later developments demonstrate, however, the manner in 
which the Parliamentarian defines “provision” appears to be less than consistent. 
Two more episodes from the Clinton years deserve attention because of what 
they teach us about the Byrd rule’s potential unintended consequences. The first 
involved a proposal in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to raise the Medicare 
eligibility age incrementally from sixty-five to sixty-seven over the course of a 
twenty-four year period, from 2003 to 2027. Democratic Senator Richard Durbin 
of Illinois raised a point of order on the grounds that the provision “produces no 
change in outlays or revenues during the required period of time”—in that case, 
the 1998–2003 period covered by the budget resolution.72 The Parliamentarian 
apparently agreed and advised the Presiding Officer that the eligibility age 
provision did indeed violate the Byrd rule.73 
Republican Senator William Roth of Delaware, a supporter of the provision, 
responded: 
[It was] very ironic that a point of order was made on this matter, because while it is 
true that it will not have a significant impact on revenue in the early years because of 
the very, very compassionate way we are introducing changing the age of eligibility, the 
fact is that this very modest approach will do a very, very great deal in the long term in 
helping the solvency of this program.74 
 
 68.  142 CONG. REC. S8,507 (daily ed. July 23, 1996). 
 69.  Id. at S8,509. 
 70.  Id. at S8,508. 
 71.  2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A), (D) (2012) (emphases added). 
 72.  143 CONG. REC. S6,092 (daily ed. June 23, 1997). 
 73.   The Parliamentarian’s rationale is certainly open to question. The relevant subparagraph of the 
Byrd rule states that “a provision of a reconciliation bill . . . shall be considered extraneous if such 
provision does not produce a change in outlays or revenues,” 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A), but it does not say 
that the change in outlays or revenues must fall within the window set by the budget resolution. See id. 
 74.  143 CONG. REC. S6,117 (daily ed. June 24, 1997). 
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Republican Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, another supporter of the provision, 
called it “the ultimate paradox” that the Byrd rule could be used to scuttle a 
measure aimed at saving Medicare from insolvency.75 
Ultimately, the Byrd rule was not what prevented Congress from raising the 
Medicare eligibility age. The Senate voted 62–38 to waive the point of order, with 
twelve Democrats joining fifty Republicans in support of waiver.76 But Senators 
could not convince House Republicans to back the change, and the provision was 
dropped in conference.77 Still, the Medicare eligibility episode seems surprising 
in hindsight. On its face, the Byrd rule simply requires each provision to “produce 
a change in outlays or revenues;” it does not require the outlay or revenue change 
to occur within the budget window. And looking beyond the Byrd rule’s text to 
its purpose, the idea that the Byrd rule would stand as an obstacle to legislation 
that dramatically reduces the long-term deficit seems to turn the Byrd rule on its 
head. 
The second episode involved the fate of balanced budget enforcement 
measures in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. During the Senate’s debate over 
that legislation, Republican Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas and Democrat 
Herb Kohl of Wisconsin introduced an amendment that would have set target 
levels for direct spending from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. If direct 
spending (such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) exceeded those 
targets, then Senate consideration of a budget resolution would be out of order 
unless the resolution fully addressed the overage.78 Democratic Senator Frank 
Lautenberg of New Jersey, who opposed the amendment, raised a point of order 
on the grounds that the amendment violated the Byrd rule—evidently because it 
would not produce a change in outlays or revenues if direct spending remained 
below target levels. A waiver motion failed on a 57–43 vote (with four Democrats 
joining all fifty-three Republicans in support), and the amendment fell out of the 
final bill.79 Immediately afterwards, Republican Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee 
introduced an amendment that would have set a sixty-vote threshold for any 
deficit-increasing legislation starting in fiscal year 2002 and would have required 
the President to submit a balanced budget to Congress starting in 2002.80 Again, 
Senator Lautenberg raised a point of order on the grounds that the amendment 
would not produce a change in outlays or revenues. This time, the waiver motion 
fell one vote short of the sixty-vote threshold, with six Democrats joining fifty-
 
 75.  Id. at S6,118.  
 76.  See Eric Pianin, Senate Votes To Raise Medicare Eligibility Wage, WASH. POST (June 25, 1997), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/06/25/senate-votes-to-raise-medicare-eligibility-
age/aa2f8985-566a-44fc-a130-eb222e0af60d [https://perma.cc/6BY8-GZ4R]. 
 77.  See Eric Pianin, Medicare Eligibility-Age Rise Rejected, WASH. POST (July 11, 1997), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/medicare/stories/med071197.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FMS6-FGU6]. 
 78.  143 CONG. REC. S6,676 (daily ed. June 27, 1997). 
 79.  Id. at S6,677. 
 80.  Id. 
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three Republicans in support.81 
The failure of the Frist amendment set the stage for the reconciliation bills 
that would follow in the early years of the Bush administration. If Frist’s 
amendment had become and remained law, the deficit-increasing Bush tax cuts 
of 2001 and 2003 could not have been enacted through budget reconciliation. In 
this respect, the use of budget reconciliation for deficit-increasing legislation in 
the Bush years followed directly from the Parliamentarian’s earlier formalism. 
D. The Byrd Rule Enters the Twenty-First Century 
The next major front in the fight over the Byrd rule concerned the use of 
budget reconciliation to enact deficit-increasing tax cuts. The 107th Congress 
began in 2001 with Republicans holding the Presidency, the House of 
Representatives, and the slimmest of Senate majorities—fifty seats plus Vice 
President Dick Cheney as the tie-breaking vote. Republicans sought to use 
budget reconciliation to slash taxes, prompting objections from Democratic 
Senators who believed that budget reconciliation should be used for deficit-
reducing—not deficit-increasing—legislation. But neither the text of the Byrd 
rule nor the other provisions of the Budget Act explicitly prohibit Senators from 
using budget reconciliation to pass legislation that increases the deficit during the 
budget window, and then-Senate Parliamentarian Robert Dove ruled in early 
2001 that budget reconciliation could indeed be used to enact deficit-increasing 
tax cuts.82 
Dove’s ruling reportedly “delighted Republicans and infuriated 
Democrats.”83 But the Republican majority’s satisfaction with Dove would not 
last much longer. Dove interpreted the Budget Act to allow for only one tax-
related reconciliation bill per year, and he also opined that a measure to set aside 
$5 billion for natural disasters would violate the Byrd rule on the grounds that 
the set-aside would not produce a change in revenues or outlays if the funds went 
unused.84 Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott responded by instructing the 
Secretary of the Senate to dismiss Dove. The Secretary of the Senate promptly 
did so.85 
 
 
 81.  Id. at S6,678. 
 82.  See David E. Rosenbaum, Rules Keeper Is Dismissed by Senate, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 
8, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/08/us/rules-keeper-is-dismissed-by-senate-official-says.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3YC-U5DN]. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See SCHICK, supra note 35, at 148–49; Charles Tiefer, Firing Parliamentarian—What Rules?, 
DAILY REP. (Fulton Cty., Ga.), May 18, 2001, at 1. 
 85.  See SCHICK, supra note 35, at 148–49 (Box 6-2); Nick Anderson & Janet Hook, Lott to Oust 
Senate Parliamentarian Who Ruled Against GOP, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2001/may/08/news/mn-60735 [https://perma.cc/R9CE-JXYM]; Helen Dewar, Key Senate Official Loses 
Job in Dispute With GOP, WASH. POST (May 8, 2001), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
archive/politics/2001/05/08/key-senate-official-loses-job-in-dispute-with-gop/e2310021-0f14-4667-a261-
54e6c033207c/?utm_term=.b3d6e359c76d [https://perma.cc/FB7B-UMC8]; Rosenbaum, supra note 82.  
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The Senate then went ahead and passed the Economic Growth and Tax 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, which slashed taxes by an estimated $1.35 trillion 
over a decade.86 The Byrd rule required (or had the effect of requiring) the 
Republicans to add several sunset provisions to the legislation, with some of the 
bill’s tax cuts expiring in 2008 and 2010. These sunset provisions ensured that the 
bill would not add to the deficit beyond the ten-year budget window established 
by the applicable budget resolution. Subsequent tax bills under President Bush 
in 200387 and 2006 also included such sunsets.88 
While the Senate passed five budget reconciliation bills during the Bush 
years, the 2001–2009 period saw relatively little Byrd rule-related activity on the 
Senate floor. Two episodes, however, deserve brief mention. The first involved 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which included several significant changes to 
Medicare, Medicaid, and student loan formulas. In December 2005, negotiators 
from the House and Senate hashed out a conference report that then went back 
to both chambers for final approval. The House passed the conference report by 
a 212–206 margin on December 19, 2005, after which House members left 
Washington for a holiday recess.89 Senator Kent Conrad then raised a point of 
order against several provisions in the conference report, including one that 
would have affected medical malpractice suits brought by Medicare beneficiaries. 
Under that provision, Medicaid patients could recover for medical malpractice 
only by showing that defendant hospitals and physicians flunked a “gross 
negligence” (rather than “negligence”) standard. Senator Conrad argued—and 
the Parliamentarian evidently agreed—that the budgetary effects of this 
provision were “merely incidental” to the non-budgetary consequences.90 A 
motion to waive the point of order garnered fifty-two votes—well short of the 
sixty votes needed—and the provision fell out of the final bill. The success of 
Conrad’s point of order not only blocked the medical malpractice provision, but 
also meant that the final bill that passed the Senate did not match the version of 
the conference report approved by the House. The House did not approve the 
Senate’s version until February of the following year.91 
Another example from this period demonstrates how the Byrd rule 
requirement that out-year deficit effects be determined only on a net basis can 
produce perverse results.92 The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act 
 
 86.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-01, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF 
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 1–8 (Comm. Print 2001). 
 87.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003). 
 88.  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006). 
 89.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Approves Budget Cutbacks of $39.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/politics/house-approves-budget-cutbacks-of-395-
billion.html [https://perma.cc/3BMP-HTCW]. 
 90.  151 CONG. REC. S14,202 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005). 
 91.  See Stolberg, supra note 89. 
 92.  See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-119, 101 Stat. 754, 784–85 (1987); Yin, supra note 2, at 222–24. 
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of 2005 (TIPRA),93 which did not pass until May 2006,94 extended lower tax rates 
on capital gains and dividends. These changes were estimated to produce large 
revenue losses in the first two years after the budget period.95 This revenue loss, 
standing alone, violated the Byrd rule.96 In order to offset this revenue loss and 
thus comply with the Byrd rule, the conference agreement added a provision that 
expanded the ability of taxpayers after 2009 convert traditional IRAs into Roth 
IRAs.97 But the Roth IRA conversion provision itself produced an estimated 
revenue loss, in later years and overall.98 Nonetheless, as Professor George Yin 
has chronicled, Senate Budget Committee Chair Judd Gregg “refused to identify 
to the Parliamentarian any provision, including the Roth IRA conversion 
provision, as extraneous for purposes of the Byrd Rule.” Instead, Gregg, a New 
Hampshire Republican, “apparently took the position that the budget effects of 
the bill beyond that time were not known and therefore could not be the basis for 
a Byrd Ryle violation.”99 Because the vote on passage of the bill was only 54–
44,100 the refusal to identify a Byrd rule violation was crucial. Evaluating the 
result, Professor Yin laments, “The end result was that the addition of a new tax 
cut provision to a preexisting tax cut bill already in violation of the Byrd Rule 
somehow was found to eliminate the violation.”101 Again, as with the 1997 
Medicare eligibility episode, the Byrd rule in operation can produce 
consequences quite far from what its author intended. 
In 2007, after Democrats regained control of Congress, Budget Committee 
Chair Kent Conrad introduced a resolution with a provision aimed at preventing 
the Senate from considering reconciliation legislation that added to the deficit 
over a five- or ten-year window. The so-called “Conrad rule” allowed any 
Senator to raise a point of order against deficit-increasing reconciliation 
 
 93.  See generally H.R. Rep. 109-62 (2005). 
 94.  The reconciliation legislation became the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-122, 120 Stat. 345 (2006).  
 95.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-18-06, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF 
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR THE “TAX INCREASE PREVENTION AND RECONCILIATION ACT 
OF 2005,” at 1 (Comm. Print 2006). 
 96.  See generally Wesley Elmore, Parliamentary Maneuvering Delays Tax Reconciliation 
Conference, 110 TAX NOTES 1020 (2006). 
 97.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 95, at 1; ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33132, BUDGET RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION IN 2005–2006 UNDER THE FY BUDGET 
RESOLUTION 41 (2006). 
 98.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 95, at 2; Leonard E. Burman, Roth Conversions as 
Revenue Raisers: Smoke and Mirrors, 111 TAX NOTES 953, 953–54 (2006). 
 99.  Yin, supra note 2, at 223; see also 152 CONG. REC. S4,443 (daily ed. May 11, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Gregg). Cf. 152 CONG. REC. S4,443 (statement of Sen. Levin criticizing Chair’s position); 152 CONG. 
REC. S4,443 (statement of Sen. Baucus criticizing Chair’s position and introducing contradictory 
projections from Finance Committee Democratic staff); Wesley Elmore, Senate Budget Chair Not 
Opposed to Controversial Revenue Raiser, 111 TAX NOTES 15, 16 (2006) (discussing critics of Roth 
conversion extension). 
 100.  152 CONG. REC. S4,446 (daily ed. May 11, 2006). 
 101.  Yin, supra note 2, at 224. As Yin observes, “successful enforcement of the Byrd Rule depends 
on highly uncertain long-term budget estimates.” Id. 
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legislation, which would require a three-fifths vote to waive.102 The Senate 
approved the measure by a 52–40 vote, effectively putting an end to the use of 
budget reconciliation for deficit-increasing bills for the next eight years. After 
Republicans regained control of the chamber in 2015, the Senate voted almost 
entirely on party lines to repeal the Conrad rule, setting the stage for the deficit-
increasing tax legislation of 2017.103 
E. No Longer “Merely Incidental”: The Byrd Rule Reaches New Heights 
President Obama’s inauguration in 2009 heralded a new era for budget 
reconciliation and the Byrd rule. The incoming administration had little interest 
in the deficit-increasing tax cuts that had been the stuff of reconciliation bills in 
the Bush years. Its top domestic policy priority was health care, and President 
Obama told congressional Democrats in April 2009 that they should be prepared 
to use budget reconciliation to enact health care legislation if that proved 
necessary to overcome a Senate filibuster.104 
Several top Senate Democrats—including Budget Committee Chair Kent 
Conrad and Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus—made clear early on that 
they would prefer not to use budget reconciliation for health care reform.105 Two 
events in 2009 made it possible for Conrad and Baucus to have their wish come 
true. First, in April, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania changed his party 
affiliation to Democrat. Including independents Joe Lieberman of Connecticut 
and Bernie Sanders of Vermont, who caucused with the majority, this switch 
brought the size of the Democratic contingent to fifty-nine.106 Then, at the end of 
June, Democrat Al Franken of Minnesota emerged triumphant from a protracted 
recount.107 This victory meant that the Senate Democrats could break a filibuster. 
In December 2009, the Senate voted along party lines to end debate and pass 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). But the story did not 
end there.108 In January 2010, Republican Scott Brown scored a surprise win in a 
 
 102.  S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., § 202 (May 17, 2007).  
 103.  S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3101(f) (May 5, 2015). Two Republican Senators, Ted 
Cruz of Texas and Rand Paul of Kentucky, voted against the repeal resolution. A third, David Vitter of 
Louisiana, was not present. Roll Call Vote 114th Congress – 1st Session, SENATE.GOV, http://www. 
senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=114&session=1&vote=00171 
[https://perma.cc/UW9N-9FWW] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
 104.  See Carl Hulse, Obama Tactic Shields Health Care Bill From a Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/25/us/politics/25budget.html [https://perma.cc/5YWP-746F]. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  To be sure, Senator Specter might have voted in favor of the Affordable Care Act even if he 
had remained a Republican. But his switch of party and a looming Democratic Senate primary made it 
more likely that he would support the central platform plank of the Democratic President. Cf. Carl Hulse, 
Specter Switches Parties, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Apr. 28, 2009), https://thecaucus.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2009/04/28/specter-will-run-as-a-democrat-in-2010 [https://perma.cc/LWH7-8EE3] 
(discussing Specter’s primary calculus). 
 107.  See Josh Kraushaar & Manu Raju, Coleman Concedes to Franken, POLITICO (June 30, 2009), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/06/coleman-concedes-race-to-franken-024383 
[https://perma.cc/HW39-HWVU].  
 108.  See Emily Smith, Timeline of the Health Care Law, CNN (June 28, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/ 
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special election for a U.S. Senate seat from Massachusetts previously occupied 
by the late Edward Kennedy, and Brown’s victory brought the size of the 
Democratic caucus back down to fifty-nine. House Democrats insisted on 
changes to the Senate version of the ACA, and Senate Democrats now lacked 
the sixty votes needed to break a filibuster on the compromise bill. However, 
Congressional Democrats succeeded in breaking the logjam through a series of 
creative parliamentary maneuvers. First, the House passed the Senate’s version 
of the ACA without amendment, a move that allowed President Obama to sign 
the ACA into law without the need for another Senate vote. Next, the House and 
Senate used the budget reconciliation process to pass the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), which included a number of 
amendments to the ACA upon which House Democrats had insisted. These 
included larger tax credits to help low- and middle-income households buy 
insurance, a repeal of the controversial “Cornhusker Kickback,” a small 
reduction in the penalty for individuals who failed to comply with the health 
insurance mandate, and a new 3.8% tax on investment income of households 
earning more than $250,000 a year. 
During the Byrd bath over the HCERA, Parliamentarian Alan Frumin 
reportedly advised Democrats that several provisions in early drafts of the 
reconciliation bill would flunk the Byrd rule. These included a provision that 
would have limited the ability of health insurers to raise rates, a provision that 
would have allowed community health centers and federal grantees to purchase 
prescription drugs at discounted prices, a measure that would have enhanced the 
powers of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, a provision that would 
have required existing group plans to cover preventive services, and a provision 
that would have barred insurers from charging higher rates to smokers.109 
Republican Senators also raised points of order against two provisions of the 
HCERA that affected Pell grant funding, and those provisions were removed 
from the final bill.110 These changes required the House to vote a second time on 
the HCERA so that its version matched the Senate’s. The second vote, however, 
delayed final passage by only a matter of hours.111 
The Byrd rule clashes over the 2010 reconciliation bill represented only the 
opening volley in what would become a years-long effort to undo President 
Obama’s signature legislative achievement via budget reconciliation. In 
November 2015, Parliamentarian Elizabeth MacDonough ruled that budget 
reconciliation could not be used to repeal the ACA’s individual and employer 
mandates—evidently because the budgetary effects were merely incidental to the 
nonbudgetary consequences.112 Later that year, however, MacDonough 
 
2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/2YRN-QNP2]. 
 109.  See Jay Newton-Small, Al Frumin’s Bad Day, TIME (Mar. 25, 2010), http://swampland.time.com/ 
2010/03/25/al-frumins-bad-day [https://perma.cc/76BX-JQHR]. 
 110.  See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010).    
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See Niels Lesniewski, Does Obamacare Repeal Have a Senate Path Without the Mandates?, ROLL 
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apparently agreed with Senate Republicans that budget reconciliation could be 
used to pass a bill that would leave the individual and employer mandates in place 
but reduce the penalties for violating either mandate to zero.113 This decision had 
only symbolic significance at the time because any legislation rolling back the 
ACA would surely have been vetoed by President Obama. MacDonough’s 
determination, however, set the stage for Republican efforts to repeal and 
replace the ACA via budget reconciliation once the party gained control of 
Congress and the presidency in the November 2016 election—and ultimately for 
the successful repeal of the individual mandate as part of the December 2017 tax 
law.  
The successive Republican repeal-and-replace efforts in the spring and 
summer of early 2017 brought new attention to the Byrd rule and to the 
Parliamentarian. In the summer of 2017, as Republicans sought to pass the so-
called “Better Care Reconciliation Act,” MacDonough concluded that a 
provision that would have temporarily blocked Medicaid funding for Planned 
Parenthood violated the Byrd rule. MacDonough also indicated that a provision 
preventing ACA tax credits from being used to purchase health insurance that 
covers abortion would have violated the Byrd rule’s requirements.114 Aside from 
these abortion-related determinations, MacDonough made a number of other 
significant decisions in Byrd baths leading up to a floor vote on ACA repeal 
legislation in July 2017. Among the provisions that were removed from the 
legislation based on MacDonough’s Byrd bath advice were: 
— A provision authorizing states to allow certain Medicaid-funded plans to drop 
coverage for “essential health benefits” that the Affordable Care Act required them to 
cover; 
— A provision establishing a six-month waiting period before consumers could enroll 
in individual market plans if they had failed to maintain continuous coverage; 
— A provision allowing states to modify the ACA’s medical loss ratio, which currently 
requires insurers to spend at least 80% of premium dollars on medical care rather than 
administrative costs and profits; 
— A provision allowing states to use certain Medicaid funds for non-health purposes; 
— A provision allowing insurers to charge older patients up to five times what they 
charge younger patients; and 
— A provision allowing states to waive various ACA rules (including rules related to 
essential health benefits and preexisting conditions) if they adopted “innovation” plans 
 
CALL (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.rollcall.com/news/home/does-obamacare-repeal-have-a-senate-path-
without-the-mandates [https://perma.cc/G3AN-X3ZU]. 
 113.  Alexander Bolton, Senate Republicans Get Green Light for ObamaCare Repeal Bill, THE HILL 
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/259752-senate-gop-gets-green-light-for-obamacare-
repeal-bill [https://perma.cc/3G9J-FMNV]. 
 114.  SENATE BUDGET COMM. MINORITY STAFF, BACKGROUND ON THE BYRD RULE DECISIONS 
(2017), http://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Background%20on%20Byrd%20Rule%20 
decisions_7.21%5b1%5d.pdf [https://perma.cc/N65N-CD5A]. For a summary of some of MacDonough’s 
other Byrd rule determinations during this summer’s health care debate, see Daniel Hemel, Graham-
Cassidy Is on a Collision Course With the Byrd Rule, MEDIUM (Sept. 19, 2017), http://medium.com/ 
whatever-source-derived/graham-cassidy-is-on-a-collision-course-with-the-byrd-rule-50a760f09419 
[https://perma.cc/M69E-HUX6]. 
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that did not add to the federal deficit.115 
Ultimately, the Republican effort to repeal the ACA in July 2017 failed when 
three Republican Senators—Susan Collins of Maine, John McCain of Arizona, 
and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska—voted against final passage.116 Yet the Senate 
Parliamentarian soon would reemerge as a crucial player during the race to enact 
a new tax law before the end of 2017, and the Byrd rule would go on to shape the 
final bill in ways large and small. 
IV 
THE BYRD RULE AND THE 2017 TAX LAW 
The tax bill that reached the Senate floor in December 2017 reflected the 
Byrd rule’s influence in a number of important respects. The legislation was 
crafted in the shadow of the Byrd rule’s prohibition on out-year deficit effects; 
thus, the Senate Finance Committee added a series of sunset clauses so as to 
ensure that the bill did not add to the deficit beyond the ten-year budget 
window.117 Virtually all of the individual tax provisions—including the new rate 
structure, the expansion of the child tax credit, the increase in the standard 
deduction, and the new twenty percent deduction for pass-through business 
income—will cease to apply after tax year 2025.118 The doubling of the estate and 
gift tax exemption also will lapse on January 1, 2026.119 These sunset provisions 
came as no surprise to informed observers, who recalled the bevy of similar 
sunsets under the Bush tax cuts. Less predictable were the ways in which the 
Senate bill was modified to comply with the Byrd rule’s prohibition on provisions 
that have no or only a “merely incidental” budgetary effect. 
The first unexpected turn of events came in late November, after the House 
already had approved its version of the bill but before the Senate as a whole took 
action. The Parliamentarian reportedly ruled that a “trigger” mechanism 
suggested by Republican Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee—which would have 
rolled back some of the bill’s tax cuts in the event that future revenue fell short 
of optimistic projections—violated the Byrd rule.120 The basis for the 
Parliamentarian’s opinion is unclear. The most plausible explanation is that the 
trigger failed to satisfy the requirement that every provision must “produce a 
change in outlays or revenues” because the provision would produce no such 
 
 115.  See Hemel, supra note 114. 
 116.  163 CONG. REC. S4,399 (daily ed. July 27, 2017) (roll call vote); see also Robert Pear and Thomas 
Kaplan, Senate Rejects Slimmed-Down Obamacare Repeal as McCain Votes No, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-republicans-
revolt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QRV9-KLDJ]. 
 117.  See generally H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (as passed by Senate, Dec. 20, 2017).  
 118.  See id. § 1101(j) (sunset of increased standard deduction); § 11021(a) (sunset of increased child 
credit); § 10221(a) (sunset of 20% deduction in new § 199A(h)).  
 119.  Id. § 11061(a) (sunset of doubling of estate tax exclusion). 
 120.  See Ryan McCrimmon, GOP Searching for New Tax Tweak After Senate Parliamentarian 
Guidance, ROLL CALL (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/tax-increase-trigger-would-
violate-rules-perdue-says [https://perma.cc/5UV4-XM3H]. 
APRILL_HEMEL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  4:54 PM 
No. 2 2018] THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A BYRD’S EYE VIEW 121 
change in the event that the trigger did not activate.121 Senator Corker initially 
voted against the bill without the trigger, though he switched his position after 
the House-Senate conference committee produced a compromise between the 
two chambers.122 
Hours before the Senate passed its first version of the bill at the beginning of 
December, Senate Finance Committee Chair Orrin Hatch stripped a number of 
provisions for purposes of “Byrd rule compliance,” according to a Finance 
Committee release.123 Senator Hatch presumably acted after receiving advice 
from the Parliamentarian that these provisions would violate the Byrd rule. The 
measures stripped at the beginning of December included, with JCT’s estimates 
of the ten-year revenue effects in parentheses124: 
— A provision that would have required foreign airlines to pay U.S. corporate income 
tax on a portion of their profits ($200 million revenue gain); 
— A provision that would have allowed taxpayers to set up 529 college savings plans 
for children in utero ($100 million revenue loss); 
— A provision that would have repealed the tax-exempt status of professional sports 
leagues, including the U.S. Tennis Association and the PGA Tour ($100 million revenue 
gain); 
— A provision that would have exempted certain private foundations from a two 
hundred percent excise tax on the value of for-profit companies that they wholly own—
apparently intended to spare the foundation that holds the Newman’s Own company125 
(revenue loss of less than $50 million, presumably because any foundation would choose 
to sell the company rather than pay the tax); and 
— A provision that would have limited the ability of plaintiff-side lawyers to deduct 
expenses in pending contingency-fee cases ($50 million revenue gain).126 
 
 121.  2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 122.  See Jordan Buie, Sen. Bob Corker Reverses Course, Will Vote for Republican Tax Bill, 
TENNESSEAN (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/12/15/sen-bob-corker-
reverses-course-vote-republican-tax-bill/956602001 [https://perma.cc/YE2K-LWQD]. 
 123.  See TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (H.R.) CHANGES MADE TO THE COMMITTEE-REPORTED BILL 
DURING FLOOR CONSIDERATION: CHANGES MADE BY PERFECTING AMENDMENT (HATCH #1618) 2, 
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12.4.17%20SxS%20Appendix%20-%20 
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QFB-JQZ9] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (Provisions Removed for Byrd 
Rule Compliance). 
 124.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-62-17, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF 
MODIFICATIONS TO THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT,” AS REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 
1–4 (Comm. Print 2017). 
 125.  Brian Faler, Newman’s Own Faces Mammoth Tax Bill after Lawmakers Fail to Spare the 
Foundation, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/07/newmans-own-tax-bill-
congress-212925 [https://perma.cc/P92E-M7W9]. As discussed below, the provision benefitting 
Newman’s Own ultimately became law as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-
123, § 41110, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4943(g)). See infra note 168 and 
accompanying text. 
 126.  Significant changes to the low income housing tax credit—which, among other things, would 
have renamed the credit as “the Affordable Housing Tax Credit” and made it harder for local officials 
to block the construction of new developments in their communities—were also stripped from the Senate 
bill on Byrd rule grounds. See Michael Novogradac, Senate Approves Tax Cuts and Jobs Act with Some 
Changes from Committee-Passed Version, NOVOGRADAC (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.novoco.com/notes-
from-novogradac/senate-approves-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-some-changes-committee-passed-version 
[https://perma.cc/82FU-MATK]. 
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One notable aspect of the provisions stripped from the Senate bill in early 
December was that several of them “scored”—in other words, the JCT assigned 
a dollar value to their revenue effects. Recall that the vaccine price provision in 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ultimately survived a Byrd rule 
challenge notwithstanding the fact that CBO could not quantify the revenue 
effects of the measure.127 Recall as well that the imported tobacco provision in 
1993 legislation made it into the final bill even though the revenue effect—$6 
million a year over five years—was smaller than several of the measures removed 
by Senator Hatch.128 All of these decisions suggest that the current 
Parliamentarian is applying the Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” proviso more 
robustly than did her predecessors. 
The list of provisions stripped from the Senate bill also illustrates the inherent 
subjectivity of the Parliamentarian’s “merely incidental” determination. For 
instance, consider whether the provision to allow taxpayers to set up 529 savings 
plans for children in utero has significant non-budgetary consequences, such that 
the revenue effects can be characterized as “merely incidental.” Key to that 
determination is an assessment of the symbolic significance of a tax provision that 
places fetuses on the same plane as children who have emerged from the womb. 
Evidently, the Parliamentarian concluded that the provision was primarily 
intended to convey a message regarding the morality of abortion rather than to 
facilitate college savings by expecting parents. That seems to be the correct 
determination, but it requires an evaluation of motives as well as budget math. 
The list of provisions removed in early December also indicates that measures 
will run afoul of the “merely incidental” proviso if they affect a limited number 
of taxpayers. Notably, this pattern applies both to provisions that bestow benefits 
on a narrow group—for example, the Newman’s Own provision—as well as 
measures that would bring such limited benefits to an end—for example, the 
foreign airline and sports league provisions. Such applications of the Byrd rule 
stand in contrast to previous Parliamentarians’ interpretations. For example, a 
provision that conveyed several hundred acres of public land to the Texas Plains 
Girl Scout Council in exchange for one dollar—arguably the epitome of a special 
interest measure—survived a Byrd rule challenge during the debate over the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1995.129 
The Senate Parliamentarian’s Byrd rule determinations continued to shape 
the tax legislation as it moved closer to passage. In mid-December, the 
Parliamentarian apparently informed Senators that a controversial provision in 
the House version—which would have modified the so-called Johnson 
amendment—violated the Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” proviso.130 The 
 
 127.  See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
 128.  See supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
 129.  See 141 CONG REC. S17,247 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995). 
 130.  See Heather Long, In Small Win for Democrats, the Final Tax Bill Will Not Include a Provision 
Allowing Churches to Endorse Political Candidates, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/14/in-small-win-for-democrats-the-final-tax-
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Johnson amendment—named for its sponsor, then-Senator and future President 
Lyndon Johnson—states that a nonprofit organization exempt from taxation 
under section 501(c)(3) cannot “participate in, or intervene in . . . any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.” The 
House bill would have created a safe harbor for statements “made in the ordinary 
course of the organization’s regular and customary activities” that results in “not 
more than de minimis incremental expenses.”131 The safe harbor would have 
applied from 2019 to 2023.132 
The question of whether the Johnson amendment violates the Byrd rule’s 
“merely incidental” proviso illustrates the ambiguity and subjectivity of that 
restriction. On the one hand, the House provision potentially would have 
enormous consequences for churches and other charities. As one co-author of 
this article wrote in the New York Times, “permitting charities to engage directly 
in electoral politics will reduce the respect they have long been afforded” and 
“will harm the sector.”133 It may also distort the political marketplace by allowing 
tax-deductible donations to go toward supporting candidates. And the motive for 
the provision clearly had little to do with revenue. Then-candidate Donald 
Trump made repeal of the Johnson amendment a major component of his appeal 
to religious conservatives during the 2016 campaign.134 House Republicans had 
introduced legislation called the “Free Speech Fairness Act” to roll back the 
Johnson amendment several times before, with nary a reference to the revenue 
effects.135 
On the other hand, the House provision would indeed have had a revenue 
effect. JCT estimated that this change would lose revenue of $2.1 billion over the 
five years for which it would have been in place, as donors who otherwise might 
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 131.  H.R. 781, 115th Congress (2017).  
 132.  See HOUSE PASSED: Historic Legislation to Overhaul Nation’s Tax Code for 1st Time in 31 
Years, WAYSANDMEANS.HOUSE.GOV (Nov. 16, 2017) https://waysandmeans.house.gov/house-passed-
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[https://perma.cc/LN8J-HEKS]. 
 135.  See Free Speech Fairness Act, H.R. 6195, 114th Cong. (2016); see also Aprill, supra note 134. 
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have made nondeductible contributions to social welfare and political 
organizations instead made deductible gifts to 501(c)(3) entities.136 The 
Parliamentarian, however, decided that this dollar amount did not shield the 
provision from the Byrd rule.137 As far as we are aware, this decision was the first 
and only time that the Parliamentarian has determined that a provision with 
revenue effects exceeding $1 billion flunks the Byrd rule on “merely incidental” 
grounds. 
The Senate Parliamentarian’s guidance with respect to the Johnson 
amendment moved the House-Senate conference committee to remove that 
measure from its conference report. Still other provisions of the conference 
report would be the subject of last-minute Byrd rule challenges. One such 
provision, pushed by Republican Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, would have 
permitted Section 529 accounts to be used for homeschooling.138 A second would 
have exempted colleges from a new 1.4% excise tax on endowment income if 
their students were not “tuition-paying.” This exemption was reportedly 
designed by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who sought to spare 
Berea College in his home state of Kentucky from the new tax.139  
The Parliamentarian’s rulings on these two measures reflect her apparent 
judgment that the political and symbolic motivations for the homeschooling 
provision and the carveout from the new excise tax outweighed the (nonzero) 
budgetary consequences. Yet they also reflect a decision to splice sections of the 
conference report in ways that are hard to rationalize. In the Section 529 case, 
the relevant provision of the conference report allowed for funds from 529 
accounts to be used for expenses related to elementary and secondary public, 
private, and religious school attendance as well as for homeschooling. The 
Parliamentarian decided to analyze the homeschooling element separately from 
the rest of the provision. In the case of the excise tax on endowment income, the 
Parliamentarian evidently considered the term “tuition-paying” apart from all 
that surrounded it rather than considering the new excise tax measure as a whole. 
In these cases, the Parliamentarian appears to be applying the Byrd rule on a 
word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence basis. 
 
 
 136.  See generally STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-49-17, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE 
EFFECTS OF THE CHAIRMAN’S AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1 (Comm. 
Print 2017). 
 137.  See Richard Rubin, Proposal to Let Churches and Other Nonprofits Get Political Blocked from 
Tax Bill, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/tax-bill-2017/card/1513303223. 
 138.  See Cruz Provision on 529 Plans for Homeschoolers Falls out of Bill, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 
2017), http://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/tax-bill-2017/card/1513748902. 
 139.  The parliamentarian stripped the qualification “tuition-paying” from the requirements 
regarding the minimum number of students triggering the provision. Berea College admits only students 
whose families cannot pay for college. See Erica L. Green, How a Tuition-Free College Turned Into a 
Casualty of the Tax Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/ 
us/politics/berea-college-bernie-sanders-mcconnell-tax-cut.html [https://perma.cc/V9T2-JUB7]. Note 
that this provision also became law in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 41109(a), 
132 Stat. 64 (2018) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 4968(b)(1)). See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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Not all of the Senate Parliamentarian’s rulings regarding the “merely 
incidental” proviso went against the Republicans. Most controversially, the 
Parliamentarian advised that a measure opening the Alaska National Wildlife 
Refuge (ANWR) to oil drilling did not run afoul of the Byrd rule even though 
the CBO projected that the measure would raise only $910 million in leasing 
revenue over a ten-year window,140 and even though ecologists and biologists said 
that the measure would have a dramatic impact on the habitats of polar bears and 
other Arctic animals.141 The Parliamentarian reportedly said that an early version 
of the ANWR provision violated the Byrd rule because it encroached on the 
jurisdiction of the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee,142 but 
Senate Republicans resolved that concern with a minor wording change that left 
the heart of the ANWR provision intact.143 
Perhaps the oddest Byrd rule challenge was to the short name of the bill, the 
“Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.” According to a spokesman for Senate Budget 
Committee ranking member Bernie Sanders, “[t]he short title has no budgetary 
impact.”144 The Parliamentarian agreed. Her determination flew in the face of 
advice given by her predecessor, Alan Frumin, who indicated in the summer of 
1993 that he did not view short title provisions as violations of the Byrd rule. A 
Budget Committee print from around that time noted that the free pass for short 
title provisions was apparently motivated by “the theory that the [Byrd] Rule 
does not cover trifling matters.”145 
These Byrd rule challenges to the conference report led to last-minute 
maneuvering by both parties. On December 19, 2017, the House passed the 
conference report in a form that included the 529 provision, the exemption from 
the endowment tax for colleges without tuition-paying students, and the “Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act” short title. When the Senate took up the conference report 
later that same day, Senator Sanders raised points of order regarding each of 
these provisions.146 Republican Senator Mike Enzi of Wyoming moved for waiver 
of Sanders’s objections.147 
 
 
 140.  163 CONG. REC. S7,710 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017). 
 141.  Id. at S7,708–10. 
 142.  See Niels Lesniewski, Tax Overhaul’s Arctic Drilling Byrd Problems Resolved, ROLL CALL 
(Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/byrd-rule-imperils-arctic-drilling-provisions-tax-bill 
[https://perma.cc/D23W-MFK3]. 
 143.  See Elwood Brehmer, ANWR Clears Senate, Young Named to Conference Panel, ALASKA J. 
COM. (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.alaskajournal.com/2017-12-05/anwr-clears-senate-young-named-
conference-panel#.WmVlRZO7_os [https://perma.cc/YL6C-GM3S]. 
 144.  Naomi Jagoda, Senate Parliamentarian Rules against GOP Tax Bill’s Name, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/365691-senate-parliamentarian-rules-against-gop-tax-bills-name 
[https://perma.cc/XJN5-89E9]. 
 145.  DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 206. 
 146.  163 CONG. REC. S8,101 (Dec. 29, 2017). Senator Sanders specified that the short title violated 
the Byrd rule constraint requiring a change in outlays or revenues and that the other two provision came 
within the merely incidental category.  
 147.  Id. 
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The ensuing debate on the Senate floor focused primarily on the Cruz 
amendment that would have allowed 529 plans to be used for homeschooling. 
Senator Cruz accused his Democratic colleagues of taking away an important 
benefit from “50 million schoolkids” on the basis of “an obscure procedur[al] rule 
that nobody at home knows what it is.”148 Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, the 
ranking Democrat on the Finance Committee, responded that the “modest 
budget impact” of the Cruz amendment “is vastly outweighed by the profound 
impact, as a matter of social and education policy, of providing Federal support 
for homeschooling for the first time.”149 The motion to waive the Byrd rule with 
respect to the Cruz amendment, the endowment tax exemption, and the short 
title ultimately failed on a strict party line vote.150 
The fallout from the Byrd rule violations in the conference report turned out 
to be limited. Republicans in the Senate passed a “clean” bill early on the 
morning of December 20 omitting the measures that had been the subject of 
successful Byrd rule challenges. House Republicans re-passed the modified 
conference report later that same day. The Byrd rule made for high drama on C-
SPAN, but did not ultimately prevent passage of the legislation before members 
of the House and Senate left Washington, D.C., for the winter holiday. 
V 
THE FUTURE OF THE BYRD RULE 
The immediate aftermath of the passage of the most sweeping tax law of the 
last thirty years is an appropriate moment for reflection on the Byrd rule’s role 
in the tax lawmaking process. This final part considers whether and how the Byrd 
rule will continue to shape future tax legislative efforts, concluding with tentative 
thoughts on the normative implications of the Byrd rule’s increasing prominence. 
A. Three Futures for the Byrd Rule 
The race toward tax “reform” at the end of 2017 might seem to suggest that 
the Byrd rule will continue to shape the tax legislative process in important ways. 
As long as a narrow majority in the Senate seeks to enact tax legislation without 
broad bipartisan support, budget reconciliation would seem to be the only 
available route around a filibuster. From the vantage point of early 2018, it 
appears exceedingly unlikely that either party will gain a sixty-vote Senate 
supermajority in the upcoming midterm elections, and it seems even less 
probable that the relative amity between the parties characteristic of the late 
1980s and early 1990s will reemerge anytime soon. All of this suggests that the 
Byrd rule’s prominence in the tax lawmaking process will be long lasting. 
There are, however, two alternative futures for the Byrd rule and the tax 
lawmaking process. The first would involve an end to the Senate filibuster. 
 
 148.  163 CONG. REC. S8,139 (daily ed. Dec.19, 2017).  
 149.  Id. 
 150.  163 CONG. REC. S8,141 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2017). 
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Without the filibuster, there would be no need to use the budget reconciliation 
process to circumvent the threat of endless floor debate. Thus, the Byrd rule 
would be rendered little more than an arcane limit on a rarely invoked procedural 
pathway. 
The second alternative future would involve undermining the Senate 
Parliamentarian’s independence or influence. The Majority Leader could instruct 
the Secretary of the Senate to install a Parliamentarian who would rubber-stamp 
majority-backed bills, or the Presiding Officer could refuse to heed the 
Parliamentarian’s advice on controversial Byrd rule questions. In this scenario, 
the legislative filibuster would remain in place, and so the Senate majority still 
would need to rely on budget reconciliation to enact legislation by simple 
majority vote, but the Byrd rule would no longer impose binding limits on the 
contents of budget reconciliation bills. 
As for the first, one of the most curious facts about the Senate is that the rule 
requiring a three-fifths supermajority for cloture can itself be changed by simple 
majority vote.151 Senate Democrats invoked this so-called “nuclear option” in 
November 2013 to eliminate the use of the filibuster against all nominations 
except for nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court.152 Senate Republicans did the 
same in April 2017 to allow for cloture with respect to Supreme Court 
nominations by simple majority vote.153 And President Trump called on Senate 
Republicans to invoke the nuclear option again to pass a budget during the 
government shutdown of January 2018.154 
Yet there are several factors that may deter the Senate majority from 
invoking the nuclear option for legislation. First, veteran lawmakers who have 
internalized the Senate’s norms may be reluctant to break with the chamber’s 
traditions. Second, members of the Senate majority are well aware that they may 
find themselves in the minority in the future, and thus that disempowering the 
minority today means that they may be members of a disempowered minority 
just a few years down the road. Third, the more moderate members of the Senate 
majority may be concerned that ending the filibuster will render them irrelevant. 
For example, the fifty-first most conservative member of a Republican-controlled 
Senate knows that, without the filibuster, fifty of her Republican colleagues can 
pass legislation that she opposes. Fourth and finally, specific Senators––namely 
 
 151.  See Charlie Savage, The Senate Filibuster, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/politics/filibuster-supreme-court-neil-gorsuch.html 
[https://perma.cc/TEV6-8NMB]. 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  See Ed O’Keefe & Sean Sullivan, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear,” Pave the Way for Gorsuch 
Confirmation to Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
powerpost/senate-poised-for-historic-clash-over-supreme-court-nominee-neil-gorsuch/2017/04/06/ 
40295376-1aba-11e7-855e-4824bbb5d748_story.html?utm_term=.77fb5fa3a765 [https://perma.cc/38NB-
G2E6].  
 154.  See Rebecca Savransky, Trump Calls for Republicans to Trigger “Nuclear Option” If Stalemate 
Continues, THE HILL (Jan. 21, 2018), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/369971-trump-calls-
for-republicans-to-go-nuclear-if-stalemate-continues [https://perma.cc/8FG5-F2ZP]. 
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senior members of the Budget Committee––have an interest in the budget 
reconciliation process remaining relevant. Without the filibuster, the budget 
reconciliation process would be mostly irrelevant, and these Senators would exert 
significantly less influence over legislative outcomes. 
To be sure, the first three factors did not prevent the Senate from changing 
its procedural rules several times in the past, nor did they prevent the Democratic 
and Republican caucuses from going nuclear on nominations in 2013 and 2017, 
respectively. The fourth factor—senior Budget Committee members’ interest in 
maintaining the relevance of budget reconciliation—presumably would not affect 
those Senators’ support for the nuclear option with respect to nominations, which 
never go through the Budget Committee. At the same time, Senators who are not 
members of the Budget Committee may have an interest in reducing the use of 
budget reconciliation for precisely the reason that Senator Dole stated: the 
budget reconciliation process potentially makes non-Budget Committee 
members feel as if they occupy subordinate positions. 
As for the possibility that the Senate majority will undermine the 
Parliamentarian’s independence and influence, some of the same factors that 
may make the Senate majority reluctant to end the filibuster also may deter them 
from pursuing this alternative path. The norm of deference to the 
Parliamentarian on procedural matters is well entrenched, and members of the 
majority know that if Presiding Officers from their party disregard this norm or 
if the Majority Leader installs a partisan as Parliamentarian, the other party will 
do the same if and when it gains control of the chamber. Still, there is at least 
some support among Senate Republicans for going down this road: most 
outspokenly, in March 2017, Senator Cruz urged his Republican colleagues to 
consider whether the Presiding Officer should simply disregard the 
Parliamentarian’s advice if the Parliamentarian proved to be an obstacle to ACA 
repeal.155 
The perils of prediction apply here, and neither of these alternative futures 
can be confidently ruled out. What is clear is that the Senate’s supermajoritarian 
norms have proven to be remarkably resilient, though somewhat less so over the 
past half-decade. The surest conclusion is that as long as the legislative filibuster 
remains in place and the Parliamentarian continues to be an independent 
interpreter of Senate procedure whose views are heeded by the Presiding Officer, 
the budget reconciliation process will likely remain an important route for tax 
legislation and that the Byrd rule will continue to shape outcomes. 
B. The Byrd Rule’s Ramifications 
The most charitable view of the Byrd rule goes something like the following: 
by preventing the Senate from passing legislation that increases the deficit 
 
 155.  See Alexander Bolton, Cruz: Let’s Overrule Senate Officer to Expand ObamaCare Bill, THE 
HILL (Mar. 9, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/323272-cruz-lets-overrule-senate-officer-to-
expand-obamacare-bill [https://perma.cc/568C-SNDC]. 
APRILL_HEMEL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  4:54 PM 
No. 2 2018] THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A BYRD’S EYE VIEW 129 
beyond the budget window, the Byrd rule imposes a measure of fiscal discipline 
on Congress. Insofar as the “merely incidental” proviso leads to the excision of 
provisions such as the Newman’s Own tax change and the Berea College 
carveout, the rule serves to limit the use of budget reconciliation for what are 
essentially giveaways to favored interests. By narrowing the range of issues that 
can be considered in a budget reconciliation bill, the rule reduces the risk that tax 
and spending legislation will be held up by fights over largely unrelated issues, 
such as abortion or immigration. And by forcing the majority party to seek 
support from the minority on more matters, the Byrd rule promotes a more 
consensus-oriented lawmaking process. 
There is a measure of truth to each of these claims. But the Byrd rule is also 
susceptible to less charitable interpretations: the rule’s effect on fiscal discipline 
is ambiguous and perhaps even perverse; it can be an obstacle to compromise as 
much as a catalyst; it probably contributes to the tax code’s extraordinary 
complexity; and the way that the Byrd rule is presently applied—through closed-
door Byrd baths and unpublished advice from the Parliamentarian to the 
Presiding Officer—makes an already-opaque tax lawmaking process even less 
transparent. 
1. Fiscal Discipline 
As a tool for imposing fiscal discipline on Congress, the Byrd rule has turned 
out to be somewhat of a toothless tiger. Congress can pass legislation that 
increases the deficit during the window set by the budget resolution and then add 
sunset provisions to avert out-year deficit effects without running afoul of the 
rule. This well-documented practice156 has become a standard tactic for Senate 
Republicans seeking to enact tax cuts. Additionally, successive extensions can 
transform nominally “temporary” deficit-increasing provisions into effectively 
permanent features of the tax code. 
Arguably, the Byrd rule has now become worse than worthless as a deficit-
control mechanism. First, once the House and Senate pass a concurrent 
resolution with a deficit cap, that cap tends to become both a ceiling and a floor. 
Thus, the budget resolution passed in October 2017 allowed Congress to add $1.5 
trillion to the deficit over a ten-year window, and the final legislation added more 
than $1.4 trillion to the deficit on a static basis.157 The $1.5 trillion figure operated 
both as a limit on what Congress could add to the deficit and as a license to run 
up a tab of approximately that amount. Previous budget reconciliation efforts 
reflect a similar pattern of Congress setting a cap for itself and then increasing 
the deficit right up to the cap.158 
 
 156.  See Jonathan Curry, Senate Republicans Contort Tax Bill to Fit Byrd Rule Box, TAX ANALYSTS 
(Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/senate-republicans-contort-tax-bill-fit-byrd-rule-box 
[https://perma.cc/V9HM-S394]; Rebecca M. Kysar, The Tricks That Will Deliver Tax Reform, SLATE 
(June 1, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/06/the_budget_gimmicks_the_ 
gop_could_use_for_tax_reform.html [https://perma.cc/2ZD2-KYUM]. 
 157.  See Curry, supra note 156. 
 158.  For example, the budget resolution agreed to May 2001 allowed for a $1.35 trillion increase in 
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Second, the elaborate exercise of setting medium-term deficit caps and then 
complying with those caps via sunset provisions potentially allows lawmakers to 
convince themselves—and perhaps some of their more gullible constituents—
that they are acting in a fiscally responsible manner when in fact their actions are 
likely to lead to long-term deficit increases. To be sure, the ruse is so transparent 
that one wonders whether it matters at all. But insofar as nominal compliance 
with the Byrd rule reinforces a fiction of fiscal responsibility, it may actually 
undermine fiscal discipline in practice. 
A third way in which the Byrd rule may perversely undermine fiscal discipline 
is by preventing Congress from passing measures such as the Brownback-Kohl 
and Frist amendments, as well as the trigger mechanism proposed by Senator 
Corker. A provision that prohibits Congress from considering future deficit-
increasing legislation through budget reconciliation—or that triggers tax 
increases in the event that revenues thresholds are not met—evidently runs afoul 
of the Byrd rule’s prohibition on measures with no budgetary effect. It is not 
obvious that the text of the Byrd rule requires this result—and quite obvious that 
the consequence is at odds with the Byrd rule’s anti-deficit intent. The irony is 
that but for the Byrd rule, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 would have added a 
statutory provision that could have prevented Congress from passing the deficit-
busting tax cuts of 2001, 2003, and 2017.159 
Fourth, the Byrd rule may in some circumstances encourage Congress to add 
deficit-increasing measures to reconciliation bills for the purpose of Byrd rule 
compliance. The 2006 Roth IRA episode is one such illustration. As noted above, 
Congress added a provision in TIPRA allowing for traditional-to-Roth IRA 
conversions starting in 2010 so that the legislation would appear to be deficit-
neutral beyond the budget window, even though the provision almost certainly 
increases the deficit in the long run. To be fair, Congress rarely adds a deficit-
increasing provision to a reconciliation bill solely for the purpose of cosmetic 
compliance with the Byrd rule, but the very fact that this maneuver occurred in 
full public view raises serious doubts about the rule’s efficacy.160 
 
the deficit over ten years, and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the reconciliation bill 
would add $1.349 trillion to the deficit over a decade. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-01, 
107TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 3 
(Comm. Print 2001); H. Con. Res. 83, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 103 (2001). The budget resolution agreed 
to in April 2003 allowed for an addition of $350 billion to the deficit, and the Joint Committee estimated 
that the resulting reconciliation bill would add $349.7 billion to the deficit over that timeframe. See STAFF 
OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-55-03, 108TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 2, THE “JOBS AND GROWTH TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2003,” at  2 
(Comm. Print 2003); H.R. Con. Res. 95, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 202 (2001). 
 159.  Emphasis is placed on the phrase “could have” rather than “would have.” Of course, even if the 
Frist amendment had become law in 1997, the Senate might have mustered 60 votes to repeal it at a later 
date, or the proponents of the 2001, 2003, and 2017 tax cuts conceivably could have cobbled together a 
filibuster-proof majority for deficit-busting tax reductions. 
 160.  Also note that Byrd rule compliance is not the only reason why Congress might, under some 
circumstances, pass provisions that appear to reduce the deficit in the short term but that have the 
opposite effect over the long term. The Byrd rule is, however, an additional impetus for Congress to play 
games with budgetary arithmetic. 
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Finally, the Byrd rule’s prohibition against adding to the deficit beyond the 
budget window has force only if the budget window is relatively short. Early 
budget resolutions covered one-year windows. Budget resolutions in the 1980s 
looked three years out; resolutions in the early 1990s established five-year 
windows; the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 stretched that to seven years; and the 
budget resolution passed in 1999 set the first ten-year window.161 In theory, there 
is nothing standing in the way of a budget window lasting twenty or thirty years, 
or even longer. Republican Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania has advocated 
a longer budget window, and Trump administration officials have expressed 
interest in the idea.162 The rule against out-year deficit effects accomplishes little 
if the budget window lasts an entire generation. 
2. Subject Matter Limits 
The Byrd rule’s prohibition on provisions with “merely incidental” budgetary 
effects is arguably necessary in order to preserve the Senate’s supermajoritarian 
norm. Otherwise, a simple majority could accomplish virtually anything via 
budget reconciliation.163 In this respect, the Byrd rule preserves the minority 
party’s power in the Senate. It also keeps certain issues off the table in budget 
negotiations, possibly reducing the risk that reconciliation bills will be held up by 
debates over abortion, immigration, and other controversial topics. 
In practice, however, the subject matter limitations imposed by the Byrd rule 
do not always appear to be very stringent. If a measure that opens the Alaska 
National Wildlife Refuge to drilling does not violate the “merely incidental” 
proviso, one wonders what other controversial measures might pass the Byrd rule 
test. For example, could a future Democratic-controlled Senate use budget 
reconciliation to reinstate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program, which—according to one estimate164—would raise $60 billion in federal 
revenue over a decade? Could budget reconciliation be used to legalize and then 
tax the sale of marijuana, which could raise $132 billion in federal revenue over 
nine years?165 The answers to these questions would depend heavily on the 
subjective judgment of the individual who occupies the Parliamentarian position 
 
 161.  BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30297, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
RESOLUTIONS: HISTORICAL INFORMATION 11–13, tbl.5 (2015). 
 162.  See Naomi Jagoda, Prominent Conservatives: Extend the Budget Window to Pass Tax Cuts, THE 
HILL (June 14, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/337768-prominent-conservatives-extend-the-
budget-window-to-pass-tax-cuts [https://perma.cc/R3DN-UMY5]. 
 163.  No such rule was in place for the first eleven years of budget reconciliation, though the risk that 
the majority party would use budget reconciliation to circumvent the filibuster may have been smaller in 
the less partisan environment of the 1970s and early 1980s.  
 164.  See Ike Brannon & Logan Albright, The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Repealing DACA, 
CATO INST. (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.cato.org/blog/economic-fiscal-impact-repealing-daca 
[https://perma.cc/TZ7K-PTUQ]. 
 165.  See Katie Zezima, Study: Legal Marijuana Could Generate More Than $132 Billion in Federal 
Tax Revenue and 1 Million Jobs, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/2018/01/10/study-legal-marijuana-could-generate-more-than-132-billion-in-federal-tax-
revenue-and-1-million-jobs/?utm_term=.27cda74008e9 [https://perma.cc/X6WJ-JJM3]. 
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at the time the questions arise. And if policies with these sorts of sweeping non-
budgetary consequences can be enacted by simple majority vote, then the subject 
matter limitations of the Byrd rule are as chimerical as the Byrd rule’s deficit 
limitations. 
Even if the Byrd rule does limit the subject matter of reconciliation bills in 
meaningful ways, the impact of such limitations on the prospects for bipartisan 
compromise are uncertain. Under some circumstances, “issue linkage” (i.e., 
adding additional issues to be bargained over in a negotiation) can indeed reduce 
the probability of agreement.166 Democrats and Republicans might, to use a not-
so-hypothetical example, have similar views regarding the extension of funding 
for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) but very different views on 
immigration. Adding immigration to the mix of issues could scuttle a deal on 
CHIP. In other cases, issue linkage makes agreement much more likely. Jack and 
Jill may be at loggerheads over whether to see the movie “Darkest Hour” or 
“Ladybird,” but adding another issue (say, where to go to dinner afterwards) may 
allow them to reach a deal. Thus, it is difficult to arrive at any general statement 
as to whether the Byrd rule’s subject matter limitations make compromise more 
likely or less so. 
Insofar as the Byrd rule stands in the way of what might be described as 
special interest giveaways, this impact too has uncertain normative implications. 
One view of the Newman’s Own provision is that it simply allowed a private 
foundation to run a profitable business in a socially responsible manner and 
channel the proceeds to charitable causes—not necessarily an undesirable 
outcome.167 (In any event, the Newman’s Own modification ultimately became 
law as part of the shutdown-averting Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.168) One 
perspective on the Berea College provision is that it would have incentivized 
wealthy colleges and universities to eliminate tuition for more students—again, a 
potentially palatable result (and again, a result that Congress ultimately 
accomplished by adding to the Bipartisan Budget Act an exemption from the 
endowment tax for schools such as Berea that do not charge tuition169). 
Moreover, the ability to include special interest provisions in legislation arguably 
serves to “grease the locked wheels of government,”170 as journalist Jonathan 
 
 166.  On the variable effects of issue linkage in negotiations, see generally T. Clifton Morgan, Issue 
Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 311 (1990). 
 167.  See Daniel Hemel, A (Lite) Defense of Newman’s Own, MEDIUM (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/a-lite-defense-of-newmans-own-d89ffa145b03 
[https://perma.cc/39A8-ETCQ]. 
 168.  Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 41110, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4943(g)). The 
Byrd rule did not apply to the Budget Act, which passed through normal order by a filibuster-proof 71-
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Allen and several others have argued in the analogous context of congressional 
earmarks. A world in which lawmakers cannot reward favored constituents 
through targeted provisions may be a world in which relatively little gets 
accomplished. Furthermore, the Byrd rule as applied in the most recent tax 
legislative effort had the effect of freezing in place provisions of the Code—such 
as the tax exemption for professional sports leagues—that might be characterized 
as special interest provisions in their own right. The Byrd rule may prevent new 
pork from being added to the Code, but it preserves the pork that is already there. 
3. Complexity 
One clear consequence of the Byrd rule is that it causes Congress to add 
complexity to the Internal Revenue Code. Title 26 is now a tangle of provisions 
with looming expiration dates as well as others that will not come into effect again 
for another eight years. Uncertainty as to whether temporary provisions will be 
extended makes it harder for taxpayers to develop long-term plans. The 
imperative to avoid out-year deficit effects has real and negative practical effects. 
All of these considerations are compounded by the fact that the Byrd rule 
makes it harder for Congress to pursue simplification measures. Consider the 
story of the Form 1040SR, intended to be “a simplified income tax return . . . for 
use by persons who are age 65 or older.”171 An early version of the tax plan that 
emerged from the Senate Finance Committee in November 2017 instructed the 
IRS to develop a new Form 1040SR and make it available to senior citizens 
starting in 2019.172 However, Senate Finance Committee Chair Hatch removed 
the provision from the bill at the beginning of December for reasons related to 
Byrd rule compliance—presumably because the budgetary effects would be 
“merely incidental” to the simplification benefits. 
The point here is not to suggest that the Byrd rule blocks the Senate from 
pursuing tax simplification. With sixty votes in the Senate—either to waive a 
Byrd rule point of order or to pass legislation through the normal process—
simplification measures such as the Form 1040SR provision remain possible (and, 
indeed, Congress ultimately enacted the Form 1040SR provision as part of the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018).173 What the Byrd rule does do is encourage 
Congress to make a mess of a code while also making it at least marginally more 
difficult for Congress to clean that mess up. 
4. Transparency 
Last but not least, the Byrd rule adds to the opacity of a legislative process 
that is already far from transparent to outsiders.174 The Parliamentarian gives 
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guidance to staffers behind closed doors, and the Parliamentarian’s advice to the 
Presiding Officer literally takes the form of a whisper.175 At least in the latter case, 
the outcome of the Parliamentarian’s thought process becomes public: those 
watching in the Senate Gallery or on C-Span—or reading the Congressional 
Record afterwards—can see how the Presiding Officer ultimately ruled on a 
point of order. When it comes to closed-door Byrd baths, there is no public record 
of the list of provisions challenged on Byrd rule grounds or how the 
Parliamentarian came down on each one. What little we know comes from what 
Senators and their staffers choose to share. 
This lack of transparency is normatively problematic for at least two reasons. 
First, members of the public cannot comprehensively assess the actions of their 
elected representatives without knowing what constraints those representatives 
faced. For example, we know from a single line of a Senate Finance Committee 
release that the repeal of the tax-exempt status of professional sports leagues was 
removed from the 2017 tax law “for Byrd rule compliance.”176 We do not know 
why the provision flunked the Byrd rule’s test or whether it could have been 
drafted so as to pass. Was the Byrd rule a genuine impediment to the provision’s 
enactment, or is it a bogeyman that Senators have used to justify a change 
requested by a well-resourced interest group? Concededly, a certain degree of 
opacity is inevitable whenever lawmakers hash out legislative language in Capitol 
cloakrooms, but the Byrd bath process makes it even harder for voters and 
activists to know what is going on. 
Second, the fact that the Parliamentarian need not explain her determinations 
in public raises the risk that those determinations will be inconsistent and 
unsupported. Why did repeal of the tax exemption for professional sports leagues 
flunk the Byrd rule test while the opening of ANWR to drilling passed? There 
may well be a plausible rationale for the Parliamentarian’s pattern of rulings, and 
we do not mean to cast doubt on this or any previous Parliamentarian’s good 
faith. But as a general matter, freedom from any explanatory requirement makes 
it all the easier to engage in arbitrary and biased decisionmaking. This is no less 
true for the Senate Parliamentarian than for anyone else. 
To their credit, the staffs of Senators Sanders and Hatch have made the Byrd 
rule’s operation somewhat more transparent by releasing certain details to the 
public. In the case of Senator Sanders’s staff, that transparency came through a 
series of press releases following Byrd baths throughout 2017.177 In the case of 
Senator Hatch’s staff, it took the form of a single document explaining the 
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rationales for various amendments to the tax bill in early December.178 In neither 
case did the release articulate the reason why any provision was found to be in 
violation of the Byrd rule. Still, drips and drabs of information are better than no 
information at all. 
To be sure, this article’s focus on the Parliamentarian’s Byrd rule 
determinations may reflect the authors’ own idiosyncratic interests. Most voters 
are unaware of the rule and unconcerned about what happens in Byrd baths 
behind closed doors. That said, transparency can serve to discipline 
decisionmaking even if it makes little difference at the ballot box. It can serve to 
legitimize a process that now appears ad hoc. 
The virtues of transparency do not necessarily lead to the prescription that 
Byrd baths should occur in full public view. But important process values would 
be vindicated if the results and rationales of Byrd baths were revealed. One way 
for this to happen would be for Budget Committee staffers from both parties to 
publish short summaries of these sessions afterwards, with some explanation as 
to how each decision was reached. The Senate Parliamentarian also could publish 
her guidance and rationale after the fact, though this proposal might impose 
additional paperwork requirements on an office that is already thinly staffed. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Reflection on the Byrd rule’s first three dozen years leads to a richer 
understanding of the provision’s importance as well as a heightened awareness 
of its potential unintended effects. The Byrd rule’s namesake envisioned it as a 
bulwark that would protect the Senate’s deliberative character and 
supermajoritarian norms from the threat posed by the fast-track budget 
reconciliation process. In practice, the Byrd rule has proven to be much less than 
that and much more. It has proven to be less than that insofar as it has failed to 
prevent either party from using the reconciliation process to implement 
controversial domestic policies with tangential budgetary impacts. And yet the 
fact that so many significant bills become law through the reconciliation route 
means that the Byrd rule ripples widely across the United States Code. Nowhere 
is that more true than in tax law, where budget reconciliation has become the 
primary pathway for legislative action and where the Byrd rule has proven to be 
a sometimes-binding constraint on the contents of statutes. 
This evaluation of the Byrd rule’s role in recent reconciliation efforts leads 
toward a set of pessimistic conclusions regarding its practical effects. The Byrd 
rule has not prevented Congress from passing legislation that increases the long-
term deficit, and in some respects it may have served to undermine fiscal 
discipline. It has not nudged the parties toward a more consensus-oriented 
approach to lawmaking—and in some instances, it has become a weapon of 
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partisan warfare. Its substantive effects have been scattershot: important 
provisions have been excised from reconciliation bills as a result of the Byrd rule, 
but the Parliamentarian’s pattern of Byrd rule decisions sometimes reveals no 
discernable rhyme or reason. This observation is not intended as an indictment 
of any individual Parliamentarian as much as it is a criticism of the opaque 
process through which Byrd rule determinations are made. 
Nonetheless, the problems with the Byrd rule do not lead ineluctably to an 
argument for the rule’s repeal. Some sort of subject-matter limit on budget 
reconciliation is probably necessary in the present environment if the Senate is 
to retain its supermajoritarian character. (Whether the Senate’s 
supermajoritarian character is itself normatively desirable presents a more 
difficult question.) True, the budget reconciliation process existed for a decade 
before the Byrd rule’s emergence without swallowing the legislative filibuster 
entirely, but the Senate was a very different—and much less partisan—body in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s than it is today. The Byrd rule turns out to be a 
rather elastic limit on budget reconciliation, but it is likely to be an enduring 
feature of Senate procedure as long as the legislative filibuster persists. Given the 
surprising durability of the Senate’s supermajoritarian norms, the Byrd rule likely 
will continue to play an influential—if often erratic—role in the tax legislative 
process in the coming years. 
The Byrd rule’s ongoing importance underscores the need for reform. The 
application of the Byrd rule to scuttle balanced budget enforcement procedures 
and revenue-dependent trigger mechanisms is a perverse result that is not 
obviously mandated by the rule’s text. The use of the Byrd rule to preserve 
provisions that confer large benefits on small groups—such as the tax exemption 
for professional sports leagues—seems like a dubious application of the “merely 
incidental” proviso that, again, the text does not demand. Perhaps there is a 
coherent theory of the Byrd rule that the Parliamentarian is invoking in these 
cases that the authors of this article have failed to discern. But if so, that is a 
further argument for greater openness on the part of the Parliamentarian and 
Senate staff. Transparency could help to legitimize a process that now seems both 
capricious and consequential. If the Byrd rule continues to shape tax legislation, 
as it likely will, then it ought to do so outside of the shadows. 
 
